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I.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotatled 78-2a-3(g) as
amended which states:
(2)

The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over . . .

(g)

Appeals from district coulrts
involving domestic relations cases
including, but not limite|d to,
divorce, annulment, propeirty
division, child custody, (support
and visitation, adoption, and
paternity.

II.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS jBELOW
This appeal is taken from the ruling on
defendant's Motion to Set Aside A Judgment for Divorce based
upon the plaintiff's Complaint and the stipulation of both
parties entered in Civil No. 5603 in the (Seventh Judicial
District Court in and for Grand County, Sltate of Utah.

III.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issue is presented for review:
1.

DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

REFUSING TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT A HEARING ON HER MOTION TO

SET ASIDE THE DECREE OF DIVORCE UNDER RULE 60(b) WHERE THE
DEFENDANT WIFE ALLEGED IN HER AFFIDAVIT THAT HER SIGNATURE
ON THE STIPULATION WAS OBTAINED BY THREATS AND INTIMIDATION,
BUT THE ALLEGED CONFRONTATION OCCURRED THREE DAYS AFTER THE
STIPULATION WAS SIGNED, AND THE MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT WAS
FILED THE DAY AFTER THE COURT RULED ON THE MOTION TO SET
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT.

IV.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are no determinative Constitution
provisions.
Rule 77(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
under Part X, District Courts and Clerks provides:
(b)
Trials and hearings; orders in
chambers. All trials upon the merits
shall be conducted in open court and so
far as convenient in a regular
courtroom. All other acts or
proceedings may be done or conducted by
a judge in chambers without the*
attendance of the clerk or other court
officials and at any place within the
state, either within or without the
district; but no hearings, other than
one ex parte, shall be conducted outside
the county wherein the matter is pending
without the consent of all the parties
to the action affected thereby.
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Rule 2,8 of the Utah Rules of Practice, Dis
and Circuit Courts, provides in applicable parts:
(a)
All motions, except uncontested or
ex parte matters, shall be accompanied
by a brief statement of points temd
authorities and any affidavits relied
upon in support thereof, . .
(b)
The responding party shall file
and serve upon all parties within ten
(10) days after service of the motion, a
statement of answering points and
authorities and counter-affidavits.
(c)
The moving party may serve and
file reply points and authorities within
five (5) days after service of
responding party's points and
authorities. Upon the expiratibn of
such five (5) day period to file reply
points and authorities, either party may
notify the clerk to submit the patter
for decision.
(f)
Decision shall be rendered without
a hearing unless requested by the court,
in which event the clerk shall set a
date and time for such hearing.
(g)
In all cases where the granting of
a motion would dispose of the action or
any issues thereof on the merits with
prejudice, the party resisting the
motion may request a hearing and such
request shall be granted unless the
motion is summarily denied. If no such
request is made within ten (10) days of
notice to submit for decision, a hearing
on the motion shall be deemed waived.
Rule 4.5 of the Utah Rules of Pjractice, Dis
and Circuit Courts, provides in applicable part:
(b)
Stipulations. No orders,
judgments or decrees upon stipulation
shall be signed or entered unless such
stipulation is in writing, signed by the
attorneys of record for the respective
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parties and filed with the clerk,
provided that the stipulation may be
made orally in open court.
Administrative Order 3 of the Supplementary Rules
of Practice and Seventh Judicial District provides:
Copies of motions and supporting
memorandums to judges under Rule 2.8 of
the Uniform Rules of Practice. When
motions are submitted to the Court with
supporting memorandums in accordance
with Rule 2.8 of the Uniform Rules of
Practice, and any requests for ruling,
counsel shall file the originals with
the Clerk of the Court and mail or
deliver courtesy copies to the office of
the District Judge in Price, Utah, when
the matter is filed in Carbon, Emery,
Grand or San Juan Counties, and to the
office of the District Judge in Vernal,
Utah, when the matter is filed in
Duchesne, Uintah or Daggett Counties.

V.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case involves a divorce action filed by Roger
E. Puckett (plaintiff) against Carolyn E« Puckett
(defendant) on September 25, 1987.

The matter was heard in

the Seventh Judicial District Court on November 2, 1987, at
which time the plaintiff was granted a divorce based on his
complaint and on a stipulation which had been filed on
October 19, 1987.

A Rule 60(b) Motion to Set Aside the

Judgment relative to the property distribution was filed on

February 12, 1988,

The motion was denied on March 10, 1988.

Notice of this appeal was filed on April 6, 1988.
The chronology of events in thijs case is very
relevant to the issue raised for review.

The plaintiff

first consulted an attorney in this matter on September 19,
1987.

The verified complaint was filed o|n September 25,

1987.

Plaintiff moved from the residence) on September 27,

1987.

A stipulation relative to property division and

wherein the defendant stated she did not intend to contest
this action was signed, first by the defendant and then by
the plaintiff, on Friday, October 16, 19817.

It was filed

with the court at 2:16 p.m. on October 19|, 1987.

The

confrontation complained of by the defendant wherein the
plaintiff attempted to take the credit ce^rds from the
defendant occurred the evening of October 19, 1987, three
days after the signing of the stipulation, according to the
affidavit filed by the defendant.
Because the defendant was anxious to move to Texas
and enter nursing school, the ninety day waiting period was
waived and the matter was heard in court on November 2,
1987.

The court found that the stipulation entered into by

the parties was reasonable and ordered that its terms be
incorporated into the findings and decree.
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The judge signed

the findings and decree on November 16th and they were filed
with the court on November 17, 1987.
The Notice of Entry of Judgment and a copy of the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of
Divorce were mailed to defendant at her new address in Texas
on November 18, 1987.
Defendant's attorney entered his appearance and
filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment under Rule 60(b) on
February 12, 1988.

The Memorandum of plaintiff's attorney

in answer to the motion was filed on February 22, 1988.
There was no reply brief from defendant's attorney and on
March 10, 1988, the judge made his ruling on defendant's
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, while in his office in Price.
The decision was mailed to the clerk of the court in Moab
and arrived on March 11, 1988, the same day that the Motion
for Oral Argument was received by the clerk of the court in
Moab from defendant's attorney.
The Notice of Appeal was filed on April 6, 1988,
resulting in this present action.
It should be noted that defendant's attorney never
asked the Seventh Judicial District Court for a ruling on
his Motion for Oral Argument or raised the matter again in
any way with the Seventh Judicial District Court.
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There is

no indication that Administrative Order 3 of the
Supplementary Rules of Practice for the Seventh Judicial
District was followed.
The court never refused to allow the defendant a
hearing on her motion.
filed.

Rather, the request was not timely

Therefore, it cannot be the basis for a claim of

abuse of discretion by the trial court.
Before addressing the legal argument in this
matter, it is necessary to address the factual inaccuracies
in the Appellant's Statement of the Case.
The only emotional or nervous breakdown of the
appellant of which the respondent is aware occurred ten
years prior to the institution of this acltion, not shortly
before.

(See Affidavit of Roger Puckett, pages 1 and 2,

paragraphs 3 and 4, appendix "A".)

She wlas not under the

care of a physician for any nervous disorder during the
pendency of this action.

Based on reports from plaintiff's

insurance company relative to doctor's bills and
prescriptions, he believes the defendant for the first time
in years saw a doctor for any kind of emotional distress on
October 29, 1987.

(See Affidavit of Roger Puckett, page 7,

paragraph 9, appendix "A".)

She was not taking any kind of

tranquilizer or medication for depression or emotional
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distress during the pendency of this action prior to October
29, 1987, unless she was paying for it herself rather than
securing it through the family's insurance.
The defendant states she was not advised to seek
legal representation during the original action.

This is

refuted by paragraph 4 of the stipulation which she signed
wherein it was stated that she understood her right to be
represented by separate counsel and had had all matters
pertaining to this action fully explained to her.
paragraph 4, Exhibit

M

B M .)

(See

That language was purposely

included because defendant repeatedly resisted suggestions
that she obtain counsel.

This information was incorporated

in the Findings of Fact and the Decree of Divorce.
The affidavit of Connie Navarre states that at the
time defendant was in the attorney's office reading the
stipulation with her daughter, she was told that if there
were any terms she did not agree with, she should not sign
the stipulation.

(See affidavit of Connie Navarre, page 2,

paragraph 5, Exhibit

,, M

C .)

was made at her request.

A modification in one paragraph
There was no request at that time

by defendant to talk with plaintiff's attorney.

Rather,

defendant deliberately ignored the attorney, even when
spoken to by her.
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At the time this action was initiated and pending,
defendant was gainfully employed at the Canyonlands Campark
in Moab, Utah and had been for several years.

She had a

checking account in her own name at Williamsburg Savings
Bank in Moab and had the complete discretionary use of all
of her income as plaintiff paid all the household bills and
furnished her $480.00 per month for groceries.

She had her

own money with which she could have hired her own attorney,
if she wished to do so.

VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse i|ts discretion in
not conducting a hearing on defendant's MIotion to Set Aside
the Judgment when the request for oral arguments was not
submitted timely and the decision on the motion had already
been made before the request was received.
In considering the Rule 60(b) motion, the trial
court addressed the question of fraud and duress and found
that the defendant failed to make even a prima facie showing
of either.
Upon consideration of the values of marital assets
provided in the plaintiff's affidavit, the court concluded
there was a reasonable distribution of the marital assets.
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The evidence does not clearly preponderate against
these findings and there is no showing that any inequity
resulted from the order so as to constitute an abuse of the
trial court's discretion.
The basis for disturbing the lower court1s ruling
on either the Rule 60(b) motion or the property distribution
would be an abuse of discretion.

Clearly, there has been

none.

VII.
ARGUMENT
EQINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENDANT A HEARING
ON HER MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DIVORCE
DECREE UNDER RULE 60(b) WHERE THE MOTION
REQUESTING ORAL ARGUMENT WAS NOT FILED
UNTIL AFTER THE COURT HAD RULED ON THE
RULE 60(b) MOTION.
Regardless of the differences in the proffered
evidence of the parties, on appeal the question raised is
whether the judge abused his discretion by making a decision
on a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment under Rule 60(b)
without a hearing.
Rule 77, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
under paragraph (b):
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f,

All trials upon the merits shall be
conducted in open court and so far as
convenient in a regular courtroom. All
other acts or proceedings may be done or
conducted by a judge in chambjers without
the attendance of the clerk ojr other
court officials and at any place within
the state, either within or wlithout the
district . . •"
Clearly, a district court judjge may rule on
motions at any place within the state.
at the judge's office in Price.

This ruling was made

At the time of the ruling,

no request for oral argument had been filed.

(See Ruling on

Motion to Set Aside Judgment, page 2, d|ate line, Exhibit "D"
and Motion for Oral Argument, page 1, dlate stamp of District
Court, Exhibit "E".)
Section (f) of Rule 2.8 of the Utah Rules of
Practice, District and Circuit Courts, (followed in the
Seventh District) states that "Decisions shall be rendered
without a hearing unless requested by the court . . .tf
While it is not clear whether this section is applicable
only to motions for summary judgment which are covered in
paragraphs (d) and (e) or to all motions, we submit that it
applies to all motions as there is no limiting language in
the text.
Rule 2.8 provides under (g) that the party
E§§i§iiDg a motion which would dispose of an action with
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prejudice may request a hearing within ten days of the time
when the motion is submitted for decision.

This time would

be after the five day period for submission of a reply brief
has expired.

If not requested within ten days, a hearing on

the motion is deemed waived.
There is no provision in Rule 2.8 for the party
submitting the motion to request a hearing.

However, in

practice, a request for a hearing, if requested, most often
accompanies the motion at the time it is filed.
not done in this case.

That was

The defendant did not request a

hearing until eighteen days after the plaintiff's reply
memorandum of points and authorities was filed with the
court and a month after the Rule 60(b) motion was filed.
During this time, the judge had already ruled on the motion.
In addition, applying the provisions of Rule 2.8(g), a
hearing on the motion would be deemed waived.
If the defendant had provided a courtesy copy to
the judge in Price, the court would have made a ruling on
his Motion for Oral Arguments.

As there is no ruling on the

motion in file, there is reason to believe Administrative
Order No. 3 of the Supplemental Rules of Practice for the
Seventh Judicial District was not followed.
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The judge did not abuse his discretion by not
waiting for a request for oral argument to be filed.
no indication such a request would be filed.

He had

If the

defendant's attorney had wanted a hearing on the motion, he
easily could have requested it at the time he filed the
motion.

To call the failure of the defendant's attorney to

timely request a hearing on a motion an abuse of discretion
by the judge would be grossly inequitable and contrary to
the Rules of Practice and the Rules of Procedure.

POINT II
THB COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN RULING DEFENDANT HAD NOT ESTABLISHED
FRAUD OR DURESS IN THE SIGNING OF THE
STIPULATION WHEN SHE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY
DATES OR DOCTOR'S NAMES RELATIVE TO
MEDICAL TREATMENT, ALLEGE ANY 4CT
CONSTITUTING FRAUD, AND THE ON^ ACT
COMPLAINED OF OCCURRED THREE DAYS AFTER
THE SIGNING OF THE STIPULATION.
The allegation by the defendant in the motion to
set aside the verdict is that plaintiff fraudulently induced
the defendant to sign the stipulation.

l\rt his accompanying

memorandum and in the accompanying affidavit of defendant,
there is not one act alleged that indicates any fraudulent
act on the part of the plaintiff.
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The case relied upon by appellant, Boyce v. Boyce,
609 P.2d 298 (Utah 1980) involved a situation where the
husband had knowingly and purposely provided false
information in response to requests for discovery and
apparently continued giving false information in the court
proceedings.

Over an extended period of time, he lied to

both the wife and the court.

Based on those actions by the

husband, the court found that the procedures in the court
were not equitable or just and that the trial court had not
therefore based its decision on the most accurate
information which could have been gathered.

In Boyce, the

husband defrauded not only the wife but also the court.

For

that reason, the Supreme Court remanded the case to be
reconsidered.

The standard for review provided by Boyce is

for cases involving fraud by one of the parties.
Nothing of like facts has occurred in this case.
No fraudulent act has been alleged or established by the
defendant.

The plaintiff furnished full and accurate

information by affidavit to the court at the time the Rule
60(b) motion was being considered.

(See Affidavit of Roger

Puckett, pages 3-6, paragraph 8, Exhibit '"A".)

The

defendant had the same opportunity to give estimated values
of the marital property.

She furnished no factual
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information to even raise a question as to the
reasonableness and fairness of the property distribution.
(See Affidavit of Carolyn Puckett, page 2„ paragraph l.a
through 1, Exhibit "F".)

The plaintiff mfrde full

disclosure, under oath.

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN USING THE PROPERLY EXECUTED
STIPULATION AS PART OF THE FINDINGS ON
WHICH THE PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION! WAS
BASED. FURTHER, THE COURT DID HOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO MbDIFY THE
PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION WHEN DEFENDANT DID
NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE IT WAS NOT A
FAIR AND REASONABLE DISTRIBUTION.
The defendant has made no showing of an abuse of
discretion by the trial court in either the ruling on the
Motion to Set Aside Judgment under Rule 60(b) or in the
division of the marital property.
Determination of the value of assets is
a matter for the trial court whjich will
not be reviewed in the absence bf a
clear abuse of discretion. Turper v.
Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982).
The stipulation, signed by both parties and
considered by the judge in the division otf the marital
property, was found by the court to be reasonable, both
initially at the trial and after review in considering the
Rule 60(b) motion.

(See Ruling on Motion to Set Aside

Judgment, page 2, paragraphs 2, 3, Exhibit "D".)
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Defendant has presented no evidence, even by her
affidavit, that the stipulation was obtained by any
misconduct of the respondent.

The conduct complained of

happened three days after the signing of the stipulation.
(See Stipulation, page 2, date line, Exhibit "B" and
Affidavit of Carolyn Puckett, page 2, paragraph 7, Exhibit
,f M

F .)

If the defendant had second thoughts after signing

the stipulation she had two weeks before the hearing in
which she could have contacted an attorney and changed her
mind.
The stipulation clearly meets the requirements of
Utah Rules of Practice in District and Circuit Courts 4.5(b)
in that it was in writing, signed by the parties and by the
attorney of record and filed with the clerk.

It was

considered by the court in making the property distribution
between the parties and the court found it to be reasonable.
In Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987)
at p. 789, the Court of Appeals stated:
Further, it is well recognized that a
parties1 stipulation as to property
rights in a divorce action, although
advisory and usually followed unless the
court finds it to be unfair or
unreasonable, is not necessarily binding
on the trial court. It is only a
recommendation to be adhered to if the
court believes it to be fair and
reasonable. Pearson v. Pearson, 561
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P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977); |Kl§in v.
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 476 (Utcih 1975).
The court found it to be reasonable both at the
initial hearing and after consideration of the evidence
presented by affidavit when considering the Rule 60(b)
motion.
The standard of review relative to the division of
property by the trial court is provided in English v.
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977) at petge 410:
The trial court, in a divorce action,
has considerable latitude of idiscretion
in adjusting financial and pr operty
interests. A party appealing therefrom
has the burden to prove there was a
misunderstanding or misapplic ation of
the law resulting in substant ial and
prejudicial error; or the evi dence
clearly preponderated against the
finding; or such a serious in equity has
resulted as to manifest a del ar abuse of
discretion.
In Colman, supra, the court stated:
Regarding challenges to propel rty
distribut ion, the Utah Suprem|e Court has
stated th at: "a party seekin g reversal
of the tr ial court must prove a
misunders tanding or misapplicjation of
the law r esulting in substant ial and
prejudici al error, or that th|le evidence
clearly p reponderated against the
findings, or that such a seri ous
inequity resulted from the or jder as to
constitut e an abuse of the tr ial court's
discretio n." McCrary v. McCr ^ry, 599
P.2d 1248 , 1250 (Utah 1979). That the
property distribution may notj have been
mathemati cally equal is not sufficient
grounds t o constitute an abuse of
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discretion, since a fair and equitable
property distribution is not necessarily
an equal distribution.
(Citation
omitted.)
The appellant has presented no evidence indicating
an inequitable distribution.

She has presented no evidence

of a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting
in any error, or any evidence that the evidence clearly
preponderates against the findings.

There is no evidence of

any serious inequity that resulted so as to constitute an
abuse of the court's discretion.
In Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the
Supreme Court states:
This court endows the trial court's
adjustment of financial interests of the
parties with a presumption of validity
and does not review their values absent
a clear abuse of discretion. Argyle v.
Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 1984);
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah
1982). We do not lightly disturb
property divisions made by the trial
court and uphold its decision except
where to do so would work a manifest
injustice or inequity. Turner, 649 P.2d
6, at 8.
The trial court found not even a prima facie showing of
fraud or duress or that the property distribution was not
fair and reasonable.

(See Ruling on Motion to Set Aside

Judgment, page 2, last paragraph, Exhibit -"D"•)
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By her own evidence the conduct of plaintiff
complained of by defendant occurred thrtee days after the
signing of the stipulation and thus had no bearing on her
signing of the stipulation.

The stipulation was not signed

by the defendant in the presence of the plaintiff.
Defendant was accompanied to the attorney's office
by her daughter, Amber Sargent, at the time she signed the
stipulation and absolutely no pressure or influence was
applied to secure her signature on the stipulation.
Defendant received her lump sjim payment the day of
the divorce and was moved to Texas by tfie plaintiff on the
day following the hearing.
she wished.

She has begun her new life as

The plaintiff made every effort to accommodate

her in every way and he incurred substantial debt to provide
her the cash payment she demanded.

Rather than trying to

defraud the defendant in any way, he has been entirely
honest and accommodating.
In the absence of the showing of a clear abuse of
discretion, the ruling of the trial cout*t should stand.

VIII.
CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly acted within the scope of
the Rules of Practice for the action and time limits on the
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motions which have been filed in this case.

The judge

waited more than fifteen days after the filing of the reply
brief from the party opposing the Motion to Dismiss before
ruling on the motion.

In his ruling, he set forth his

findings as to the relative merits of the positions advanced
by each side.
At the time of that ruling, the court reviewed
again the property distribution based on the affidavits
accompanying the submitted memoranda and found no evidence
to warrant a change in his initial ruling that the division
of property was fair and reasonable.

There is no showing of

manifest injustice or inequity to cause the appellate court
to disturb the apportionment of the property by the trial
court.
By appellant's own evidence, the allegation that
the stipulation was procured by fraud or misconduct is
refuted.

The stipulation had been filed with the court

before the alleged conduct occurred.
Both parties to a divorce are usually under
considerable emotional strain during the pendency of a
divorce action but this is not grounds to set aside a
properly executed stipulation.

There was no abuse by the

trial court in using the stipulation and property settlement
in the complaint as the basis for the distribution of the
marital property.

-20-

The only basis for overturning the ruling on the
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment or to modify the property
settlement is a clear abuse of discretion by the trial
court.

There is nothing in the record showing any abuse of

discretion in this entire case.

IX.
REQUEST OF ATTORNEY^ FBES
Rule 33 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
provides for the payment of attorney's fees when an appeal
taken is frivolous and without foundation.

By the

appellants own evidence, this appeal is without foundation
in fact and therefore frivolous.

The respondent has been

caused considerable emotional stress in this matter both by
the filing of the Motion to Set Aside tl}e Judgment which was
also without any foundation in fact and in the filing of
this appeal.
costs.

He has suffered unnecessary legal fees and

A request for awarding reasonable attorney's fees in

this matter to the respondent is respectfully submitted.
DATED this £Shz

day of September, 1988.
Respectfully submitted,

Blaine M. Coates
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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Elaine M. Coates, #4881
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 South 100 West ,
Moab, Utah 84532
(801) 259-6901

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
']

ROGER E. PUCKETT,

vs.

]1
>
]

CAROLYN S. PUCKETT,

]

Plaintiff,

No, S&03_
AFFIDAVIT OF
ROGER R- PUCKETT

Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH
County of Grand

)
) ss.
)

ROGER E. PUCKETT, being first dily sworn upon
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am the plaintiff in the above entitled

2.

That the defendant and I had been married for

matter.

twenty-seven and one-half (27 1/2) years prior to the
granting of this divorce.
3.

That I first attempted to divorce the

defendant in 1977 when I moved out of our residence in
Price, Utah and established a separate residence.

4.

That in 1977, about three months after I

moved out, the defendant exhibited bizarre and eventually
violent behavior and was hospitalized for approximately one
month for her condition.

That was the only time she has

been hospitalized for any emotional problem during the years
of our marriage.

In 1977, I moved back into the family

residence and resumed our relationship for the next ten
years until I initiated the present action.
5.

I first consulted an attorney in this present

action on Saturday, September 19, 1987.

Upon advice of

counsel, I moved out of the family residence on September
27, 1987.

During the pendency of this action, I paid the

mortgage payments and all the utility bills (including the
telephone) on the family residence.

I also gave the

defendant $300.00 per month to meet her living expenses
during this time.
6.

In attempting to come to an agreement on the

distribution of the property, I told the defendant she could
have any of the marital assets we had accumulated but if she
took an asset which had an associated debt,, she also had to
assume the debt.
7.

I made no false representation to the

defendant as to any fact contained in the stipulation she
signed.

8.

The value of all our assets at the time of

the divorce on November 2, 1987, was a^ follows:
a*

The home and real property located at

1381 S. N. Kayenta, Moab, Utah:

On Ma^ 1, 1987, the home

was appraised for $61,000.00 and a refinancing agreement was
entered into with Williamsburg Savings Banks for a period of
fifteen years at 8 1/2% interest on a loan of $61,211.00.

I

estimate the equity in the home on November 2, 1987 at less
than $350.00.

The two adjoining acres are financed, the

amount owing on the property on November 2, 1987 was
$5,470.46.

The last two sales of property in the area

involved the sale of two 2 1/2 acre lots at $1,600.00 per
acre.

I estimate there is no equity in the lots as I owe

more on them than I could sell them for at this time.

The

real estate market in Moab for unimproved property is
practically non-existent.
b.

The 1985 Buick Park Avenue automobile

was financed over four years at $409.93 per month.
93,300 miles on it as I use it in my job.

It has

When I tried to

trade it in in August, 1987, I was offered $1,000.00 less
than the total of the remaining payments due.
there is no equity in the vehicle.

I estimate

c.

The 1975 Ford pickup truck has a

trade-in value of $1,450.00 or a retail value of $2,175.00,
d.

The household furniture and furnishings

were divided according to the wishes of the defendant.

I

told the defendant she could take anything she wanted.

She

took all the antique furniture we had accumulated, the deep
freeze, the washer and dryer, the microwave, sewing
machines, the dining room set, various lamps, table, etc.
She also took all the household pots and pans, small kitchen
appliances, all the linens except two sheets, two towels and
two washcloths, all the draperies off the windows and all
the books.

She also took the family movie camera and all

the films of the children.

She also took a set of leather

working tools that were a gift to me from my brother over
thirty years ago and are irreplaceable.

She took all the

dishes and silverware, the stereo and the newer TV.

What

she did not actually take to Texas with her, I moved into
storage in Moab for her.
e.

The 1970 GTO Pontiac has an insurance

policy on which the replacement value is listed as
$3,800.00.

It is paid for and in her possession.

I paid

the insurance through February, 1988 on this vehicle.

f.

At the time of working out the divorce

settlement, I sold all of the company stock available to me
to raise the $16,000.00 paid to the defendant.

My stock

account on November 2, 1987, including my basic plan and the
company's supplement totalled 504 shares.

The total value

of the stock on November 2, 1987 was $14,136.36 but I have a
loan with the company of $8,127.53 whicji is secured by this
stock.

This is the maximum amount I could borrow against my

contributions to the stock plan.
company's contributions.

The loan excludes the

In October, 1987, I sold 562

shares to obtain the $16,000.00 paid to the defendant as
settlement in this divorce action.
g.

The value of my pension plan with Utah

Power and Light as of November 2, 1987, was $787.93 payable
monthly effective at age 65.
h.

I am age 53.

The value of my only IRA account, with

Williamsburg Savings, was $63.34 as of November 2, 1987 and
still is $63.34.
i.

The savings account with Williamsburg

Savings was closed in the summer of 1987 when we withdrew
the approximately $700.00 in the account and took a vacation
together.
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j.
truck.

The camper fits the back of the pickup

It was purchased in 1980 for $1,000.00.

I estimate

it to be worth at most $500.00 today.
k.
years ago.

I paid $800.00 for the horse about three

The horse suffers from azaturia which has

damaged his kidneys and so he is of no value.
ridden hard or worked.

He cannot be

The horse trailer is a 1970 model

that was purchased at the same time as the horse for
$850.00.

It is probably worth approximately $400.00 today.
1.

The boat was purchased for $240.00 in

1969, the trailer cost $125.00 at the same time and the
motor is a 1958 rebuilt Evinrude that I paid $90.00 for
several years ago.

I don't know if it is still operable.

I

would estimate everything is old and fully depreciated.
8.

During the pendency of this action from the

25th of September until the 2nd of November, the defendant
received $194.00 in dental services, $1,378.00 in podiatry
services and $130.00 in services from Grand Junction Ortho
Association which was partially paid for through my company
insurance.

I paid the balance.

I made the defendant aware

of the COBRA medical provisions which allows her to continue
her insurance with my company.

~6~

9.

The only additional medical services

defendant received during the pendency of this action was
one office visit on October 29, 1987, to Dr. Paul R.
Mayberry for $25.00.

If she was under treatment for a

nervous condition, it is not reflected by any bills or
insurance payments.

Her office visit of October 29, 1987,

was after she signed the Stipulation oii October 16th.
10.

During October, 1987, defendant charged

$170.12 on our Mastercard account, $133.56 on our J. C.
Penny account, $112.65 on our Sears account and
approximately $64.41 in long distance qalls, in addition to
the $300.00 per month that I was giving her to meet her
living expenses.

I have paid all these bills even though

several of the purchases were made from! catalogs after I had
retrieved the credit cards.
11.

The defendant had her own separate checking

account for the last seven or eight years.

Twice each month

during the last seven or eight years on payday, I wrote her
a check for $240.00.

I paid all the household bills and

mortgage and charge cards and accounts from my checking
account.

Her only responsibility from her $480.00 per month

was to buy groceries for us.

The defendant was employed at

the time this action was instituted and had been for several
years and all her earnings were at her disposal.
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12.

The defendant alone decided she wanted to

move to Texas wherr

she has relatives.

I packed and moved

everything she wanted to take with her and moved her on
November 3rd and 4th, 1987.

I allowed the defendant to take

any of our possessions that she wanted, the only requirement
being that if she took an asset which had an associated
debt, she had to assume the debt also.

She told me she

didn't want the house, truck, horse, camper, etc., that she
wanted cash.
13.

In negotiating the property settlement, I

offered $12,000.00 at first because this was all I thought I
could borrow and it was through negotiation and further
borrowing that I was able to raise $16,000.00 which was what
she wanted.
14.

The defendant expressed to me several times

her preference for a lump sum so that she would have money
to pay tuition to attend nursing school and begin a new life
in Texas.

I accomodated her in every way I could.
15.

In reliance on this divorce being settled and

final and the time for appeal having passed, I married my
high school sweetheart on December 22, 1987.
FURTHER your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this ^ £ _ day of February, 1988.
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Subscribed and sworn to before me this XZ
February, 1988,

My commission
>mmission expires:

Notary Public
Residing at Moat), Utah

day of

84532
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Blaine M. Coates, #4881
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 South 100 West
Moab, Utah 84532
(801) 259-6901

IN THE SBVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER E. PUCKETT,
Plaintiff,

i
i

VS.

;

CAROLYN S. PUCKETT,

]

Civil No. 5603
STIPULATION

Defendant.
COME NOW the Parties and stipulate and agree as
follows:
1.

That the Parties hereto agree to the property

settlement as outlined in the Complaint in this matter.
2.

That the Defendant agrees tp accept

$16,000,00 lump sum payment in lieu of alimony.
3.

That the Defendant agrees to waive any and

all interest in the Plaintiff's pension plan and stock with
Utah Power and Light.
4.

That Defendant understands fully her right to

be represented by separate counsel and has had all matters
pertaining to this action fully explained %o her.

5.

That Defendant does not intend to contest

this divorce.
DATED this Jlj£_ day of October, 1987.

^±r^A:.^3?k
Elaine M. Coates
Attorney for Plaintiff

Roge^E. Puckett
Plaintiff

Carolyn
lyn &. Puckett
Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Grand

)

) ss.
On this
day of October, 1987, personally
appeared before me Roger E. Puckett, Plaintiff, and Carolyn
S. Puckett, Defendant, and being first duly sworn,
acknowledged to me that they executed the above and forgoing
Stipulation.
My commission expires:

£7-27-90

3lm*^M^ re

Notary Public
Residing in Moab, Utah
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GRAND COUNTY GLEftK

Elaine M. Coates, #4881
Attorney for Plaintiff
36 South 100 West
Moab, Utah 84532
(801) 259-6901

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROGER E. PUCKETT,

N^>. SAQ3AFFIDAVIT OF
CONNIE NAVARRE

Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT,
Defendant.

1_
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss .
)

County of Grand

CONNIE NAVARRE, being first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

That I am the legal secretary of Elaine M.

2.

I was working in the law office the week of

Coates.

October 16, 1987.
3.

The defendant had an appointment to come in

at her convenience and sign the Stipulation in this case.
4.

At the appointed time, the defendant and her

daughter appeared at the office and after reading the
Stipulation and a little conversation with me and her

daughter, the defendant signed the Stipulation on October
16, 1987.

I notarized the Stipulation and gave her a copy.
5.

I specifically told the defendant that if

there were any terms of the Stipulation she did not agree
with, she should not sign it,
6.

At no time did the defendant appear under

stress and there was certainly no duress applied by anyone
at the time she was in the office,
7.

At the conclusion of the signing, the

defendant requested that I prepare a Power of Attorney from
her to her daughter, Amber Sargent.

This was done to her

satisfaction.
FURTHER your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this ^C^

day of February, 1988.

iitiimw/urfe^
Connie Navarre
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^rCl day of
February, 1988.

I
My commission expires:

___/:_'5/__<7/_

Nota'fy Publi'c
Residing at Moab, Utah

84532
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FILED BY - < f e <>
GRAND COUMTiY/QJiERKL
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROGER E. PUCKETT,

\>

RULIfNG ON MOTION TO
SET ASIDE JUDGMENT

I

Civil No. 5603

Plaintiff,

vs.
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT,
Defendant.

'

On November 2, 1987, pursuant to stipulation of the
parties regarding the distribution of their property, the Court
granted a divorce to the plaintiff.

The defendant has now

filed a motion to set aside the Divorce Dectee as it pertains
to the division of assets contending that s^ie was suffering
from mental distress at the time of the signing of the
stipulation and that the plaintiff forced her to sign the
stipulation by duress and threats.
The plaintiff objects to the Motion and denies that
the defendant was under any doctor's care for stress and
further denies that any duress was used against her and further
alleges that the payment of a cash amount ofc $16,000 and the
receipt of certain personal property by the defendant was a
reasonable and fair distribution of their atssets.
The defendant's Affidavit presents no medical
records or names of doctors to substantiate her claim that she

was under treatment for mental stress at the time.

She

presents no estimates of value of assets and debts to show that
the settlement was not reasonable.
The plaintiff has submitted the Affidavit of the
secretary of his attorney which states, in effect, that there
was no duress asserted at the time of the signing of the
Stipulation, and that the defendant appeared in the plaintiff's
attorney's office and signed the Stipulation while accompanied
with her daughter and after having coolly and rationally
considered the Stipulation.

The plaintiff's Affidavit has

outlined the accumulation and debts of the parties with
estimates of value from which the Court concludes that there
was a reasonable distribution of assets in the Stipulation.
The defendant has failed to establish even a prima
facie showing of duress, or that she was subject to fraud, or
that the agreed Stipulation was grossly unreasonable.

Based

thereon, the Court denies the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment
as prayed for.
DATED this

/{/

day of March, 1988.

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies o
the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SET JUDGMENT by depositing
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Elaine M. Coates
Attorneys at Law
36 South 100 West
Moab, Utah
84532
Lowell V. Summerhays
Attorney at Law
4609 South State Street
P. 0. Box 1355
Sandy, Utah
84091

DATED t h i s

/anf.

day of March, 1988

Secretary
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Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Defendant
4609 South State Street
P.O. Box 1355
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355
Telephone: (801) 942-8008

FILED m - ^ 1
^
GRAND' C G ^ Y C t p K

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER E. PUCKETT,

MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Plaintiff,
Civil No.:

vs.

5603

CAROLYN S. PUCKETT,
Judge:

Boyd Bunnell

Defendant.

The

Defendant,

counsel Lowell

Carolyn

S. Puckett,

by and

through

V. Summerhays herewith moves the above-entitled

court for an order granting oral argument

in the above-entitled

matter.
DATED t h i s

9 —

day of

March

, 1988.

LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS

L o w e l l L< Sumir
ummerhai/s

1

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

MOTION FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

lowing, first class, postage prepaid, this

tf

—

to the folday of

March, 1988:
Elaine M. Coates
36 South 100 West
Moab, Utah 84532

<*_
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Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154
LAW OFFICES OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Defendant
4609 South State Street
P.O. Box 1355
Sandy, Utah 84091-1355
Telephone: (Qnl)
942-8008

F(Lt')3Y- <&K>
GRAND C0UUTY CLERK

IN IIM MVflirH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF
CAROLYN S. PUCKETT

ROGER E. PUCKE'I i ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

5603

tivii NO.p

CAROLYN V

Pl.K.'Kh I I ,
Judge:

Boyd Bunnell

Defendant.

STATF nr T C Y A S

)

COUNTY OF

)
1,

as

l .unlyn

"'.

ss.

PIN \<r\\

,, ilo upon mv hat-h

swpflr a or J st-"> f ^

follows:
1.

That

°.

" ' **!

I

a fit

the

Defendant

in

the

titled

matter.
'lalnti

*

t w e n t y - s e v e n arm oru • '

i f
,

1

j

H I i•(* MI n a r r i e d
vorce.

for

3.

That prior to our divorce, I had been hospitalized

for a nervous breakdown and was under psychiatric care.
4.

That I was under a doctor's care for the treatment

of a nervous condition during the pendency of this divorce action.
5.

That I was not represented

by counsel during the

pendency of this divorce action.
6.

I could not afford to hire an attorney as I had no

income and all our funds were in a checking

account

under

the

Plaintiff's name.
7.

That on October 19, 1987, the Plaintiff, Roger E.

Puckett, came to my residence in Moab, Utah, and asked me to sign
the Stipulation

for the property settlement

in this matter.

I

refused to sign the Stipulation, and told him that I was not going

to accept the terms and provisions of the Stipulation, be-

cause I thought I was entitled to a more fair distribution of the
marital assets.

At that time, Roger E. Puckett pushed me around

and threatened me physically.

He tore my purse trying to get my

credit cards from me; he hit me; pushed me against the wall; and
inflicted verbal abuse as well as physical abuse upon me.
peatedly

He re-

told me that if I did not sign the Stipulation as it

was, that I would end up on the street, and that my mother would
end up on the street, with nothing.

My mother was a witness to

the Plaintiff's violence, and, at that time, called my daughter,
Amber Sargent, to come to the house to prevent further violence.

2

0.

The Plaintiff is an employee of Utah Po\

Co. and he threatened to turn off my electricity
give me money *

groceries i

9.

r-1 i

his

"i-m ey, Elairv

ing

: R, buf rii
Ill,

and to never

did not sign the Stipulation.

tne e\ .

of the Plaintiff

< .•.-.it

October 19, 198 ".

the midst

and physical abuse, I attempted to call

-. Coates.

I left

•;-:ss<uje oi \ her •insw^r-

not receive a call back from her.

(i

continuance

harrassment and violence

: ;--•

the physical
i -

'..u verbal
waq under

a great deal of stress .»'* i physical and menta: exhaustion when
this Stipulation was signed.
II
fully aware i

At

tin" I inn-1 I signed the Stipulation, T was not

the consequences and ramifications nf my action.

I was confused aiid urider a great deal of emotional stress because
of •hH violence which the Plaintiff had perpetrated upon mo, iml
because of my general emotional state at the time.
I;,"1, Si iter1 ltirj" divorce has been entered, T have r

A

to the State of lexas where I am gainfully employed, and am in
the process of rebuilding my 111e after the divorce.
realizr

I n iw

»rppd into signing the Stipulation against my

free will, and it is my desire to ask the court Im

a more fair

and equitable distribution of the marital assets whirb I In1 I"" 1 aintiff and I arqiilrpd owor hvnntv-seven arid one-half (27 1/2) years
of marriage.

3

DATED this

2nd

day of

February

1988.
Ca
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
STATE OF TEXAS

)

COUNTY OF

)

I

orange
On this

SS

2nd

day

of

February

One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eighty-eight, personally
before me, a Notary Public in and for said County,
CAROLYN 5, PUCKETT

,
appeared

Orange

, whose name is subscribed to the

above instrument as party thereto, personally known to me to be
the same person described

in and who executed the said annexed

instrument as party thereto; and duly acknowledged to me that she
executed the same freely and voluntarily, and

for the use and

purposes therein mentioned.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I have hereunto set my hand and

affixed my Notary Seal at my office in

vidor

,

Texas, the day and year in this Certificate first above written.

^ J
My Commission E x p i r e s :
2/25/88

NOTARY PUBLIC

Myra S. Boutwell
Residing

4

in

V i d o r , T x . , Orange County

ELAINE M. COATES, #4881
Attorney at Law
Attorney for P l a i n H f f
36 South 100 West
Moab, Utah 84532
(801) 259-6901
IN THE COUPT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
]1

ROGER E . PUCKETT,
'Icsponilcn t ,
Vfl

CAROLYN S,

]1

:= A

C a s e N<
CERTIFICATK

1- MAILING

]

I'UCKETT,

UtH e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t .

]

.1.
I HEREBY CERTIFY
S e p t e m b e r » I 9B8 ,
and i

thnl

<n» t h e _*2£_;T1 Hny o t

I ma i i e d , p o s < a g e p r e p a i d ,

iiii(.ii«f,

«i( IiKf'ilM'jiNDFN i ' S BRTRF t o

Lowell V Summerhays
Attorney for Defendant
P. 0. Box 1355
Sand, y, U1 ; a h 84091-8008

f IMII
the

I 4 "' I i it"
following:

